This paper proposes a notation that can be used to describe information ow policies that may have transitivity, aggregation and separation (of duty) exceptions. Operators for comparing, composing and abstracting these policies are described. These allow complex policies to be built from simpler policies. A formal semantics is given based on the notion of noninterference for deterministic systems. An unwinding of this de nition is developed that can be used for any policy that does not contain a separation exception.
Introduction
Con dentiality security is concerned with restricting the disclosure of information in systems. One way of achieving this is to use an information ow policy, which de nes the di erent classes of information (for example, classi ed, secret, etc.) that can exist in the system, and a ow relation, which describes how information may ow between these classes. Traditionally, information ow policies have formed lattices 7] , with good reason, as it is relatively clear how to build state-based enforcement mechanisms. However, it has been shown in 12, 14] that it is desirable to enforce non-transitive information ow policies. That is, a ow policy where information is allowed to ow from class a to class b, and from b to class c, but not from a to c. For example, we may wish to specify that top-secret information may ow to class brigadier (representing the class of information a brigadier may handle), and brigadier information may ow to class secret, but topsecret information may not ow to secret. Examples of such policies will be considered in this paper.
Another desirable generalization for ow policies concerns the consistency of the class join operator (the least upper bound). Traditionally, if information may ow from a to c and from b to c, then the join of information of class a and b may ow to c. If this assumption is removed, we have a means of describing aggregation ow exceptions: a user at class c is allowed to sink information at class a or class b, but not their aggregate. That real aggregation policies exist (as opposed to unnecessary aggregation policies 18]), is demonstrated by Brewer and Nash in their Chinese Wall paper 4], and supported with further examples by Meadows 21] . Many models for aggregation policies have been proposed 4, 17, 20, 14] . We seek a uni ed de nition of an information ow policy that includes aggregation properties.
Separation of Duty rules are normally associated with integrity policies and models 6]. For example, a check must be proposed by a manager, and cleared by an accountant, or vice-versa, before it can be written. However, separation rules can also apply to information ow (con dentiality) policies. For example, a user of a dial-up database may only view database information if it is accompanied by charging information. This type of separation ow policy can be thought of as the dual of an aggregation policy: only the aggregate may ow, not the individual classes.
In 14, 15 ] state transition models are described that enforce a large class of these information ow policies. Security is based on an informal notion of information ow under a MAC style regime. This paper consolidates these models by providing a formal semantics for their information ow policies.
Section 2 describes the notation for describing information ow policies that may contain transitive, aggregation and separation exceptions. Relations and operators over ow policies are developed that allow complex ow policies to be compared, composed and abstracted. Section 3 gives a semantics for these information ow policies based on the notion of noninterference. The semantics is abstractly de ned in terms of a traces model for deterministic systems. Section 4 considers how this de nition can be unwound into conditions on states and state transitions. The unwinding is restrictive in that it does not consider policies with separation exceptions. The unwinding is not unlike that for traditional noninterference, but with some additional conditions.
Our model provides a basis for studying other information ow poli-cies. Section 5 outlines how other models, in particular those that provide dynamic upgrading and partial trust, can be interpreted within our policy framework. Section 6 studies the speci cation of a complex information ow policy, a Chinese Wall policy 4, 17] . The interested reader should refer to 13, 14] for further examples. Section 2 is a revised version of material that has been published in 14]. The necessary proofs for Section 2 are given in 13]. We have chosen to use the Z notation 23] to provide a consistent syntax for presenting the mathematics in this paper. In using Z, it has been possible to syntax-and type-check the de nitions using the fuzz tool. The appendix contains a short introduction to the Z notation used in this paper. We have avoided using many constructs that are peculiar to Z; much of the notation presented in this paper can be easily recognized from its set and logic origins.
Conglomerate Flow Policies
An information ow policy de nes the di erent classes of information that can exist in a system and how information may ow between these classes. We let class be the set of all information classes. We are not further interested in its structure, except that it is non-empty. We introduce the basic type class] Usually a simple relation of type class $ class is used to describe a ow policy. With such a policy there is an implicit assumption that if (information at) class a may ow to class c and class b may ow to class c, then a and b may together ow to c. To remove this assumption it will be necessary to specify whether information formed from the combination of a and b may ow to c. Thus a ow policy shall be represented by a relation of type (P class) $ class. Given such a ow policy P and A : Pclass, a : class, then A 7 ! a 2 P (sometimes written as A P a) means that information at conglomerate class A may ow to class a. This is similar to stating that thè join' (aggregate) of information at the classes in A may ow to class a.
The notion of a ow policy could be further generalized by representing the policy as a relation of type (P class) $ (P class). This would facilitate policies with inconsistent greatest lower bounds. For example, class a may ow to classes b or c, but may not ow to both (i.e., may not ow to conglomerate fb; cg). Such a generalization is not considered in this paper;
it is a topic for further research.
For the purposes of this paper, information ow policies are used to describe constraints on how information may ow in a system. The environment of a system can be viewed as a collection of users. These users need not be actual system users, but could correspond to interfaces to other subsystems. It is users that give a degree of meaning to the information that they sink and source, and therefore we associate an information class with each user. This`binding' is static and gives the class of information that the user is considered to handle (source or sink). A user bound to class a is assumed to be`aware' of the the information that he may handle, and therefore for consistency, we require that fag 7 ! a 2 P hold in the system ow policy P. This requirement does not imply that it is impossible to build a system that prevents information owing from a user to himself. Rather, given our view, it is futile to attempt to enforce such a policy, since a user is always aware of his own class of information. Similarly, if a : class; B : P class, and suppose the ow policy P includes B 7 ! a 2 P, then since information at a class a may always ow to itself, then a 2 B should also hold: a user bound to class a may sink a conglomerate B of information, and in doing so, is really combining this with information he already knows, i.e., information of class a.
These constraints are re ected in the global constant policy, the set of all conglomerate ow policies policy == f P : (P class) $ class j 8a : class; A : P class A 7 ! a 2 P ) (a 2 A)^(A ran P) g
The constraint on policy ensures that information at any class (considered by the policy) may always ow to itself, regardless of the conglomerate it may be involved with. Note that, given the de nition of policy we have
The alphabet P of a ow policy P gives the set of classes it is de ned in terms of. It is de ned as : policy ! P class 8 P : policy P = ran P Example 1 A ow policy has two information classes lo and hi, with the usual interpretation that information may ow from lo to hi. This policy has alphabet flo; hig, and is described by the relation HiLo There is a partial ordering relation v de ned between ow policies. If P v Q then we say that Q is no less restrictive than P, in that any ow that is not allowed by P will also not be allowed by Q 7 ! a 2 Q)( a 2 P ) (A \ P) 7 ! a 2 P) A 7 ! a gP Q = (P@( P \ Q)) (Q@( P \ Q)) Note that we have, (P Q) = P Q and (P Q) = P \ Q.
If A is a set of conglomerate policies, then L A gives the generalized join of the policies in A, i.e., the least upper bound of the policies in A. The policy join operator is closed over aggregation, separation and re exive ow policies, but is not closed over quasi ordered policies: if P; Q 2 aggpol then P Q 2 aggpol; if P; Q 2 refpol then P Q 2 refpol, and if P; Q 2 seppol then P Q 2 seppol.
The policy join operator ( ) may be used to construct complex policies from simpler policies. Given policies P and Q, since policy join gives their least upper bound, then (P Q) is no less restrictive than policies P and Q. This implies that (P Q) enforces all the ow restrictions speci ed by P and by Q. Intuitively, this means that a system secure by policy (P Q) is also secure by the policies P and Q. The policy intersection operator ( ) does not appear to have a useful interpretation in the construction of information ow policies; we have included it only for completeness.
Example 6 Consider the aggregation policy from Example 4. Introduce a new class sso which represents the class of information the system security o cer may handle. The security o cer is allowed to sink bank1 and bank2 information individually and as an aggregate. The policy governing the security o cer is SsoPol Note how the new policy permits ow from both lo and hi to cons (neither operand policy speci es a restriction to the contrary), but no conglomerate involving both bank1 and bank2 may ow to cons.
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It is possible when developing a policy to end up with an unintentionally restrictive result. For example, if a policy was de ned as BankPol3 == NewBankPol (fconsg agg ow bank1) Then BankPol v BankPol3 holds, but this new policy no longer permits information ow from bank1 to cons|the join of two policies must preserve the ow restrictions of the original policies. When building complex policies it may be worth investigating if the intended allowable ows of the original policy are preserved. For Example 6, BankPol = NewBankPol@ BankPol, giving reassurance that the intentions of the old policy are preserved in the new policy.
The set of all ow policies with the same alphabet A forms an algebra that is a sublattice of policy with restrictiveness de ned by superset; de ned by intersection; de ned by union, and universal upper and lower bounds de ned by >A and ?A, respectively. Since it forms an algebra, each policy P has a complement within the sublattice de ned by (comp P), where comp : policy ! policy 8 P : policy comp P = (>( P)) ((?( P)) n P)
The following example illustrates how the policy complement operator can be used to construct a policy in terms of the ows that are not permitted. The environment of the system has some structure in that the set of actions it can engage in is partitioned by conglomerate classes using the binding syspol : policy : action ! P class 8 x : action ( x) syspol Policy syspol gives the conglomerate policy to be enforced. Function gives the conglomerate class at which an action is engaged. The usual multilevel treatment of noninterference associates a single class with each action. For example, a secret user engages a secret action. It is desirable to model actions engaged at conglomerate classes: a colonel (Example 8) may wish to distinguish between entering secret or con dential information. Any action engaged by the colonel that involves secret information (as ultimately determined by the colonel), should have binding fcolonel; secretg. In a practical system identifying such a conglomerate source might be achieved by associating classes (or conglomerates) with system objects such as windows, programs, etc. When the colonel invokes a command within a secret window, this is a conglomerate source fcolonel; secretg 1 . Colonel actions involving con dential information should have binding fcolonel; confidentialg.
Engaging an action at some state may be visible, in some way, at a number of di erent classes (i.e., visible to users bound to those classes Let the system state be represented as a vector of variables denoted s n;m;f . The number of bank1 and bank2 requests received so far is given by n and m, respectively. Flag f indicates whether the consultant has requested a count on bank1 or bank2 (denoted by the values B1acc or B2acc, respectively). Flag f is initially set to value nil. A secure speci cation for this system is described in Table 1. This table describes Intuitively this system is secure|as soon as the consultant observes some information concerning one bank (number of requests), he is denied access to the other bank. Section 4, which unwinds the de nition of security, will consider how this proof may be conducted. We wish to specify a system that permits these users read and write access to the ight information, yet enforcing the above ow policy. This system provides commands of the form a:x, where a gives the class of the command (engaged by the user) and x the request: rd denotes a read request, and wr:i a write (data i) request. Only read commands generate output (if it is secure to do so) at the class of the requester. A state of this system is represented by a vector s a;i , where i gives the (single) ight details and a a security class (lo or hi) associated with the information. The initial state is s lo;; . either lo or hi An upgrading command lo.up is provided which forces the level of the ight to hi. This may only be engaged at class lo. To enter a hi ight, the hi user must rst log on as lo, upgrade, and then return to hi to update. Once upgraded, the lo user no longer has read access to the ight variable. There are alternative approaches to specifying a system that enforces policy FlightPol. In this example, stored ight information is modeled by a ight eld (to hold the information) and a class eld (for its classi cation). The upgrading strategy that permits the single variable to be, in a sense shared by the three classes of users, follows the advice on truthful database update 26]. An alternative approach is to polyinstantiate 9]. That is, have two separate copies of the ight variable, one for lo and the other for hi, information.
Unwinding Conglomerate Noninterference
Conglomerate noninterference is de ned in terms of sequences of actions and views. This section considers how the de nition may be unwound into conditions on states and state transitions. The unwinding approach taken makes an approximation for (t; a) by permitting overestimation of information ow. Thus the unwinding is su cient for enforcing aggregation policies (any policy from aggpol, which includes re exive and quasi ordered policies), but is unsuitable for policies that include separation exceptions.
The approach taken in this section is to rst transform the (aggregation) policy into conditions over a lattice-based policy. The unwinding of conglomerate noninterference then becomes a generalization of the usual unwinding conditions for traditional noninterference. This is signi cant, as there is a quite a body of experience in building systems that enforce similar unwinding conditions.
High Water Marks and Aggregation Policies
Given the aggregation policy syspol, then for any class a : syspol the set of conglomerate classes that may ow to a can be considered to be drawn from the enclosed area pictured in Figure 1 . Since the policy does not contain Function (t; a) records a history of the information that has interfered with the view of a given class. It follows from its de nition that it is mono-tonic with respect to progress along a trace, i.e., 8 t; s : seq action; a : class (t; a) (t a s; a) (t; a) is rather like a high water mark on a particular class: it rises to re ect the information classes that can interfere with the view. Having engaged trace t, in a secure system, the area between (t; a) and lims(a) gives the allowable future high water marks for class a. As (t; a) rises, the set of possible future high water marks diminish. For example, if (t; a) heads towards limit C , then eventually limit B will no longer be a potential high water mark.
This interpretation of (t; a) (as a high water mark) provides the key to developing unwinding conditions for security under conglomerate policies. We shall rede ne conglomerate security in terms of a system with a latticebased ow policy providing high water marks (with limits on these water marks). The lattice ow policy is simply a powerset lattice of security classes with subset as the ordering relation.
Aggregation Policies as Lattices
If classes are the components of a conglomerate ow policy, then let level be the components of a powerset lattice built from the set of classes.
level == P class An aggregation policy P can be mapped to the powerset lattice built from components of P by the dual mapping ? : aggpol ! (P class) 7 In this case we call the mapping ow preserving. There can be alternative de nitions for ? that achieve this same result. An intuitive (and valid) alternative might be to de ne ? P A = A, i.e., the`bottom' of the diagram in Figure 1 . Example 12 The policy HiLoBankPol (Example 7) can be transformed into the (optimized) lattice described in Figure 3 with the ow preserving mapping from Table 4 : Flow Preserving Mapping for policy HiLoBankPol class lo is a member of ? syspolfag, re ecting the fact that lo can ow to any class of the policy. The previous example (11) provided an intuition for levels in an implementation lattice as the conglomerates that may arise in the system. In this current example, a level such as fbank1; log can be thought of as representing the conglomerates fbank1g and fbank1; log|in the policy HiLoBankPol, ows involving either of these two conglomerates are treated in an identical manner. 4 
Approximating High Water Marks
In this section we will develop an unwound approximation of the function. This approximation over estimates ows and is therefore su cient for maintaining security.
In addition to generating immediate outputs or views, actions may change (s; a) . Recall from Figure 1 that any approximation for (t; a) must always lie between fag and lim syspol a. The constraints given ensure that its value (a level) lies between T ( lim syspol a) and some limit from ( lim syspol a), and that it is monotonic along state transitions (i.e., may only oat upwards). As information ows to class a, the high water mark of a must be increased to re ect the new information content of a. Since we are enforcing aggregation policies (drawn from aggpol) then choosing a greater initial level than (hi; a) will have no e ect on security. We choose uwn (initstate; a) to have the greatest possible level that is dominated by all limits on a i.e., the greatest lower bound on the elements of lim syspol a. In doing so, we do not exclude any conglomerate that the high water mark (of a) may be legally increased by. ; x) ; a)) ) (s l r)) ) (out(s; x; a) = out(r; x; a)) 3
Conditions C1 and C2 are concerned with ensuring that high actions do not interfere with the low part of the state. Versions of these conditions appear to form the basis of any unwinding for noninterference. For example, they are similar to conditions 2 and 3 in 10] and 11]. Condition C3 ensures consistency between actions and the views that result: every view must dominate the action. Condition C4 ensures that the high portion of the state does not interfere with low views. These last two conditions are concerned with that part of noninterference analysis that considers the relationship between outputs and the system state. For example, they are similar, at least in intent, to condition 4 in 11].
Lemma 2 Purging along a trace for a given conglomerate class has no e ect on that part of the state that the conglomerate may not ow to, i.e., 
If t a hxi is to be purged for x, i.e., x = A, then (t a hxi=A) = (t=A).
But the inductive hypothesis, equation (1) above, and the transitivity of l together imply that do* (t a hxi) l do* (t a hxi=A). If t a hxi is not to be purged for x, i.e., x 6 = A, then in addition to equation (1) above, unwinding condition C1 also implies (since : ( x l)) that do* (t=A) l do(do* (t=A); x) This, equation (1), the inductive hypothesis, and transitivity of l , together imply that do* (t a hxi) l do* (t a hxi=A) Thus we have : ( x l) ) do* (t a hxi) l do* (t a hxi=A) (2) Consider t a hxi such that x l. Unwinding condition C2 gives do* (t) l do* (t=A) ) do(do* (t); x) l do(do* (t=A); x)
But since ( x) 6 = ( ? syspol A), then (t=A) a hxi = (t a hxi)=A. Thus we have that the inductive hypothesis implies that ( x l) ) do* (t a hxi) l do* (t a hxi=A)
By induction, equations (2) and (3) high water mark (Conshwm) which is initially set to level cons. The algorithm permits this to oat to one of its limits based on which bank the consultant accesses.
To prove this system secure we must compute a view equivalence relation such that unwinding conditions C1 to C4 hold. This is often a trial and error process and the reader is referred state of this system maintains information about the single ight. From the implementation lattice we see that there are two kinds of ight information, flo; flg and flo; hi; flg. We thus require some way to relate the ight information with these levels. In Example 10, Under this relation the unwinding conditions are met and thus the system is secure. This system uses a restricted form of high water mark on the ight variable|it may be raised only from below. In this way, it is not possible for a Trojan Horse operating at hi to signal a lo user by either raising the high water mark or not, on what is initially a lo variable. If we attempted to use the more general high water mark approach 24] where it could be raised from above, it would not be possible to prove security.
In this example we are using a (restricted form of) high water mark on a state variable to re ect the fact that it can be used to hold di erent classes of information. This is not the same as the already discussed notion of a high water mark on classes (i.e., and uwn ) which gives a high water mark on information sunk to a class of the environment.
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The ow preserving mapping provides information that may assist in the implementation of the system. In the previous example (14) the implementation lattice de ned two possible levels for ight information. The system speci cation must consider how any state variable designed to hold ight information relates to these levels. We chose a (restricted) high water mark approach. An alternative design might be to polyinstantiate, i.e. have multiple copies of, the variable for all levels of information it is expected to hold. In the case of FlightPol, there would be two versions of the ight variable: one for lo users and the other for hi users.
Classes of Flow Policy and their Models

Re exive Flow Policies
If a ow policy is re exive, then each class will have a single maximum in lim P a, since (A 7 ! c 2 P)^(B 7 ! c 2 P) implies A B 7 ! c 2 P, and thus lim P a = f( S f B : P class j B 7 ! a 2 P g)g Given this, the conditions on states and state transitions simplify. Each class is bound to a static high water mark as pictured in Figure 6 . A re exive The security objectives for re exive policies are similar to those for partial trust 2, 5]. A (user at) class a is trusted to handle information at any level between ? P fag and uwn (s; a). From Example 10, a pilot (class flight) is allowed to read hi information and write to lo. However, the pilot cannot use the system to copy hi information to lo|cutting a section of hi text and pasting it into a lo window is not permitted. Of course the pilot could re-type, as lo, the hi information back into the system. But this is not a concern since binding a pilot to class flight is associating a degree of trust with that user in that he handles such information appropriately.
In examples 13 and 14 the implementation lattice and level bindings suggest some implementation detail: if we plan to use some (state) object to hold information at class a then in the implementation it may hold information at any level bounded by ? P fag and the limits on uwn (s; a). This is not unlike the high water mark approaches with upper limits 24, 25] . Examples 13 and 14 use high water mark-based implementations. Polyinstantiation-based implementations are also possible, where copies of the variable should be made for the levels bounded between ? P fag and uwn (s; a).
Re exive policies provide a convenient abstraction of these security models. It is possible to reason about the nature of the policies in an abstract manner without resorting to a speci c system model.
Quasi Ordered Flow Policies
If the policy to be enforced forms a quasi ordered set then the ow preserving mapping simpli es further to a single point in the powerset lattice.
? P fag = S f B : Pclass j B 7 ! a 2 P g lim P a = f( ? P a)g This corresponds to the Birkho powerset mapping 3], which maps a quasi ordered set to a partial order. In this case, the high water mark model is similar to the traditional lattice-based models such as 10].
6 Policy Speci cation: Chinese Wall
In 4] Brewer and Nash describe a model for enforcing Chinese Wall policies. Such policies are a good example of aggregation, and this section develops a general policy framework for specifying Chinese Walls.
A stock market database holds con dential information on di erent organizations. A unique class is used to represent the information of each organization. Organizations are classi ed in terms of con ict (of interest) sets. Two organizations appear in the same con ict set if they have con icting business interests. The aim of our Chinese Wall policy is to prevent a consultant from gaining information on more than one organization within any con ict set.
A con ict set is a component drawn from the set con ict-set == P class For example, the con ict set Banks : con ict-set might give the set of banking organizations, i.e., the set of classes that represent information from those banks. A number of (possibly intersecting) con ict sets may be dened over a collection of organizations. The classes in a con ict set must be disjoint: one bank may not discover anything about any other. A consultant may sink information only about one class within a con ict set. De ne con ict-pol : (con ict-set class) ! policy 8 cset : con ict-set; cons : class con ict-pol(cset; cons) = S forg : cset (forgg agg ow cons)g
The policy con ict-pol(Banks; cons) speci es that a consultant, class cons, may sink information about only one organization within the con ict set Banks.
A consultant may consult for a number of organizations so long as he obeys the con ict policy for each con ict set, i.e., he may consult for a number of organizations so long as there is no con ict of interest. De ne China : (P con ict-set) class ! policy 8 A : P con ict-set; cons : class China(A; cons) = L fcset : A con ict-pol(cset; cons)g If A speci es a set of con ict sets, and cons a consultant's class, then the policy China(A; cons) describes the Chinese Wall policy. For example, given Banks; Oil; Insurance : con ict-set cons : class the ow policy is speci ed as China(fBanks; Oil; Insuranceg; cons).
The granularity of aggregation in a conglomerate ow policy extends to information classes, not system components ( les, users, etc). Thus in the Chinese Wall example, if there are a number of consultants (as there would normally be), the policy views them as a single entity such that when one consultant accesses a particular bank, all other consultants are prevented from accessing other banks. An alternative Chinese Wall policy that re ects the fact that there may be di erent classes of consultant information is parameterized by a set of consultant classes China2 : (P con ict-set) (P class) ! policy 8 A : P con ict-set; cons-set : P class China2(A; cons-set) = L fc : cons-set China(A; c)g
The policy China2(A; cons-set), de nes a Chinese Wall policy for the consultant classes de ned in cons-set over the organizations in A. The classes of cons-set might be used to represent individual consultants, or alternatively groups of consultants liable to collude.
It is clear that for any practical policy, the number of possible information classes will be very large. It would not be practical to directly implement the implementation lattice. Implementations must be sought that preserve (but do not necessarily build) the lattice policy.
At rst, it might appear that specifying conglomerate policies would be a laborious a air, given that all classes of information must be enumerated. However, we view it as an advantage. We have a framework in which the model designer is obliged to precisely state the exact meaning of policies in the context of the system. The policy relations and operators (Section 2) allow comparison and combination of these complex policies.
Conclusions
Conglomerate ow policies are stateless speci cations of security in a system. They describe the di erent classes of information that can exist in a system and how they may propagate. The operators for composition and comparison allow the construction of complex information ow policies. These policies provide a uni ed notation for reasoning about con dentiality, aggregation and separation. Conglomerate policies provide a convenient abstraction of security: we may reason about the nature of a policy without resorting to system details.
We propose a semantics for conglomerate policies based on noninterference, and unwind this de nition for a class of useful policies|aggregation policies. The resulting conditions are not unlike the traditional unwinding conditions for noninterference. This is signi cant as there is quite a body of experience in building systems that enforce similar conditions.
Appendix: The Z Notation
The Z notation is based on strongly typed set theory and rst order logic. Much of the Z notation can be recognized from its set and logic origins. This appendix describes some of the possibly less obvious notation that appears in the paper.
Sets
A set may be de ned in Z using set speci cation in comprehension. This is of the form f D j P E g, where D gives declarations, P a predicate and E an expression. The components of f D j P E g are the values taken by expression E when the variables introduced by D take all possible values that make the predicate P true. For example, the set of squares of all even natural numbers is de ned as f n : N j (n mod 2) = 0 n 2 g. When there is only one variable in the declaration and the expression consists of just that variable, then the expression may be dropped. For example, the set of all even numbers may be written as f n : N j (n mod 2) = 0 g. An equivalent way to de ne this set is as f n : N (2 n) g|the predicate may be dropped if it equals true. Sets may also be de ned in display form such as flo; hig. 
Functions and Relations
Declarations
A variable declaration in Z is of the form V : E (or V 1 ; : : :V n : E), where V is an identi er and E an expression that de nes a set. Variable V has type, the component type of E, and may take on any value from E. Local variables may be introduced by existential and universal quanti cation. Figure 7 : Some Z notation.
